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Fall 2021


 

 

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

9:30–11:30









 
 

PHIL 76000
Zen
Prof. Priest
Room TBA

 

11:45–1:45

PHIL 76500
Biology of MInd
Prof. Garson
Room TBA

PHIL 77600
Relational Moral Address
Prof. Fricker
Room TBA

PHIL 80200
PhD Proseminar
Profs. Khalidi and Vasiliou
Room TBA
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PHIL 80300
MA Proseminar
Prof. Gilmore
Room TBA

PHIL 77800
Aesthetics and Nature
Prof. Shapshay
Room TBA

2:00–4:00

  PHIL 77000
  Emotion
  Prof. Prinz
  Room TBA

PHIL 72000
Logic
Prof. Pappas
Room TBA

PHIL 80000
Topics in Modal Logic
Profs. Kripke and Weiss
Room TBA

PHIL 77200
Law and Language
Prof. Neale
Room TBA

4:15–6:15

PHIL 77500
Race, Racism, and Racial Justice
Prof. Mills
Room TBA

PHIL 77700
Rethinking Democracy, Socialism, and Feminism
Prof. Gould
Room TBA

Philosophy Colloquium Series
Rooms 9204/9205

 

6:30–8:30

 

PHIL 77100
Reference and Experimental Philosophy
Prof. Devitt
Room TBA

 

 

at Mount Sinai
4:00-6:30
(Sept. 8 - Dec. 2)
     

PHIL 77900 / MPH-0007
Social Justice in Public Health and Medicine
Prof. Rhodes
Room TBA


Students may also take courses at other schools in the Interuniversity Doctoral Consortium. Choose a school from the list below to see the course schedule for the current semester (where available).
The Graduate Center's Current Student Handbook has information about and instructions for registering for classes at other consortium schools. 
 

Spring 2021 COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

Phil 76500 
Biology of Mind
Prof. Garson

4 credits
Mon. 11:45-1:45
Room TBA 
 

This course is a survey of the ways that philosophy of biology can help us make progress on traditional and contemporary problems of mind and society. Are people altruistic or are we ultimately selfish? How much of my personality is due to genetics, and how much to environment? What does it even mean to call something “innate?” Does culture evolve? Does race exist in a biological way, or is it merely a product of human classification? Are there evolved psychological differences between men and women? Are mental disorders diseases, or forms of social deviance? Does human nature even exist, or is the very idea of human nature a tool of oppression?
 
Along the way, we will familiarize ourselves with concepts and debates within the philosophy of biology, such as the adaptationism debate, the evolutionary psychology debate, the group selection debate, the innateness debate, and debates about the very idea of genetic causation. Increasingly, philosophers in many different fields – such as philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophy of medicine and bioethics, political philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of race and gender – are expected to have some familiarity with concepts and debates of philosophy of biology. One purpose of this course is to give you that familiarity.
 
This course does not presuppose any previous background in biology. 
 
During the class, we will read philosophers of biology such as Peter Godfrey-Smith, Elisabeth Lloyd, Elliott Sober, Quayshawn Spencer, Samir Okasha, Cecilia Heyes, Daniel Dennett, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Paul Griffiths, Susan Oyama, Edouard Machery, Michael Devitt, and Karen Neander. As a framework for these readings, we will use the second edition of my textbook, The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. All readings will be available through Dropbox. 
 

This course will satisfy Distribution Group B.

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Phil 77000 
Emotion
Prof. Prinz

4 credits
Mon. 2:00-4:00
Room TBA
 

This seminar investigates the nature and the roles of emotions from an interdisciplinary perspective.  We will begin by investigating competing theories of emotions, and related.  Are emotions embodied?  Do they require cognition?  Are they ways of seeing or ways of acting? 
 
We will also look at where emotions come from.  Are they innate?  Are they shaped by culture?  Do they change over historical time?  In addition, we will look at debates about emotions and rationality.  Are emotions rational, irrational, or arational?  What makes an emotion inappropriate?  Why do emotions linger? 
 
There are related questions about emotions in psychiatry.  When is an emotion unhealthy?  When are they excessive or deficient?  Along with these general questions, we will consider specific emotions, such as anger and disgust, as well as epistemic emotions, such as boredom and interest.  This will raise questions about the role of emotions in various domains such as ethics and aesthetics.  Though philosophical readings will outnumber the rest, we will also read perspectives from several other fields including, psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and history.
 
This course will satisfy Distribution Group B.

This course will satisfy the program meta-requirement.


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Phil 77500 
Race, Racism, and Racial Justice
Prof. Mills

4 credits
Monday 4:15-6:15
Room TBA 


This course will look at the interlinked themes of race, racism, and racial justice. The timing is particularly appropriate given the summer of 2020’s massive national and global protests sparked by George Floyd’s killing by the Minneapolis police, and the new Biden Administration’s declared commitment to making the achievement of racial equity a central policy. We will consider such issues as the history of racism, the “metaphysics” of race, and competing analyses of racism, before turning to the central theme of institutional and structural racial injustice. How should they be understood, and what normative framework is best suited for conceptualizing and remedying them?
 
Recent work by political theorists such as Iris Marion Young, Tommie Shelby, Andrew Valls, Charles Mills, Christopher Lebron, Shatema Threadcraft, and others will be canvassed, but we will also take a look at some popular/grassroots framing of the issues. If there is time, we may also glance at some of the legal literature, and how “equal protection” has historically been interpreted.

This course will satisfy Distribution Group C.

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Phil 77600 
Relational Moral Address
Prof. Fricker

4 credits
Tuesday 11:45-1:45
Room TBA 

 
“Moral address” is a phrase used to signify our moral responses to wrongdoing. We will explore explicitly second-personal conceptions of moral address, and also the ways in which our second-personal responses are socially embedded and scaffolded. We will start with a parallel case of autonomy, and specifically the feminist re-envisioning of autonomy as essentially relational. These theorists saw that the capacity for autonomy was socially sustained in relation to others, and could be eroded if those relations failed. Similarly, the second-personal responses of moral address—notably blame—might be viewed as essentially relational, and therefore similarly socially sustained and trained. Two fundamentally important elements in these sustaining relations are trust and hope. We will therefore spend some significant time exploring different views of both trust and hope, and analyzing how both trust and hope are woven into our various ‘reactive attitudes and feelings’ through which (on P. F. Strawson’s conception) we perform moral address. We will also examine the idea of moral obligation from a relational point of view (for instance, what it is to owe someone else that you do something), and how proleptic mechanisms (that might be construed as taking up a ‘hopeful’ stance towards someone else’s capacity to behave better) can corrupt our relations of moral address so that they deteriorate into forms of moral control.
 
Learning goals:
By the end of the course you should have a good understanding of a range of central topics in moral address of an interpersonal or relational kind. You will have thought deeply about a range of different, sometimes opposing, positions concerning these topics. My aim is to offer enough background as we go along, so that students with little prior grounding in this area of moral philosophy can take full part. There will be two strictly required readings for each week, which we will actively discuss in class, and there will also be at least two other recommended weekly readings. Our collective discussion of the required readings will be normally opened by a short student presentation, to help you develop relevant professional skills of presenting, using a handout or powerpoint, and spontaneous constructive critical discussion of issues raised.
 
You will also have a half-hour one-to-one session with me on a bullet-point plan for your term paper. The purpose of this meeting is to support your progress in choosing, researching, and planning the topic and argument of your term paper, due three weeks later.
 
Assessment:
Term paper (5000-5500 words incl. notes but not bibliography).

This course will satisfy Distribution Group C.

This course will satisfy the program meta-requirement.

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Phil 72000
Logic
Prof. Pappas

4 credits
Tuesday 2:00-4:00
Room TBA 


This course is a philosophical introduction to classical symbolic logic. No prior background in logic is assumed. We will study propositional logic and first-order predicate logic. Topics to be covered include semantics, syntax, and proof procedures. We will also touch on the metalogical concepts of soundness and completeness. The goal is to achieve both practical mastery and philosophical understanding of elementary logic.

This course will satisfy Distribution Group E.

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Phil 77700
Rethinking Democracy, Socialism, and Feminism
Prof. Gould

4 credits
Tuesday 4:15-6:15
Room TBA 


This course will explore the interconnections that can be discerned within and among democratic, socialist, and feminist theories and will analyze some of the central questions that arise at their intersection. Some of the liveliest questions in contemporary political philosophy concern whether it is possible to forge a unified approach that pulls together core elements of these three diverse traditions of thought which, together with anti-racist and postcolonial perspectives, could serve to guide fundamental social and political transformations. 
 
The course will investigate these potentials by first considering some readings from democratic theory that incline in a socialist direction (J. S. Mill, Dewey, Macpherson, Pateman, Gould, Christiano), and then some classical socialist theories that are explicitly or implicitly democratic (e.g., Marx, Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simone, Louise Michel, Lucy Parsons, E. Bernstein, Emma Goldman, Volarine de Cleyre, G.D.H. Cole), followed by feminist approaches to democracy that are compatible with socialism, e.g., Tronto's "Caring Democracy," or that extend the account of domination and exploitation to encompass the phenomenon of group oppression (Iris Young, Nancy Fraser, Ann Ferguson).
 
The course will go on to take up some key conceptual issues for a possible democratic socialism, delineated with all three theories in view. These problems will include the role of the market and democratic self-management at work (G. A. Cohen, Gould, Schweickart, Carens, Vrousalis); varieties of inclusive political participation, deliberation, and representation (Mansbridge, J. Cohen, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor); and models of mutual aid and cooperative care (e.g., Kropotkin, Selma James, S. Federici, Incite! Women of Color against Violence, Dean Spade). Attention will be paid to areas of substantive (dis)agreement in regard to new institutional and social forms, and also to the differences in methodologies and emphases that the various theoretical perspectives would bring to the development of a more unified approach to social and political change.

This course will satisfy Distribution Group C.

This course will satisfy the program meta-requirement.

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Phil 77100
Reference and Experimental Philosophy
Prof. Devitt

4 credits
Tuesday 6:30-8:30
Room TBA 


This course is concerned with the substantive issue “What is the nature of reference?” and with the methodological issue “How should we go about answering that question?” The answer to the methodological question has implications for the method of “armchair philosophy” in general.
 
Substantive. It is usual to think that referential relations hold between language and thoughts on the one hand, and the world on the other. The most striking example of such a relation is the naming relation, the sort that holds between ‘Socrates’ and the famous philosopher Socrates.  Many other sorts of words are best seen as having other sorts of referential relations to the world for which various terms are used; for example, ‘denotation’ and ‘application’.  Usually, philosophers are interested in reference because they take it to be the core of meaning.  Thus, the fact that ‘Socrates’ refers to that philosopher is the core of the name's meaning and hence of its contribution to the meaning of any sentence - for example, ‘Socrates is wise’ - that contains the name.
           
The central question about reference is: In virtue of what does a term have its reference? Answering this requires a theory that explains the term’s relation to its referent. Until the 70s, answers were nearly always along descriptivist lines: the reference of a term was determined by descriptions competent speakers associated with it. Then came the revolution, led by Kripke, which rejected description theories for names and some other terms in favor of some sort of historical-causal theory.
           
Methodological. How should we get to the truth of the matter about reference and language in general? The received methodology, in both philosophy and linguistics, appears to be that we should consult our metalinguistic intuitions (which in philosophy are often thought to be a priori). In particular, theories of reference seem to have been supported in this way.  And the intuitions consulted in philosophy have been those of philosophers themselves.
 
This methodology has been challenged by a group of “experimental philosophers”, starting with the now-classic paper, “Semantics Cross-Cultural Style”, by Machery et al (2004). They tested the intuitions of the folk, showing that they differ from those of the philosophers and vary across cultures. Stephen Stich and Edouard Machery, take this to discredit the whole enterprise of theorizing about reference. It will be argued in the course that experimental philosophers are right to be critical of the received methodology but wrong to respond by testing metalinguistic intuitions of the folk. Rather, theories of language, including theories of reference, should be tested against linguistic usage. Previous versions of this class have led to such tests, some resulting in publications. I am looking for more collaborators.

Substance. The course will be concerned primarily with theories of reference for singular terms: for proper names like ‘Socrates’, demonstratives like ‘this cat’, pronouns like ‘she’, definite descriptions like ‘the last great philosopher of antiquity’, and indefinite descriptions like ‘a lion’. Anaphoric reference will not be considered.  However, there will be discussion of “natural kind” terms like ‘gold’ and ‘tiger’ and “artifactual” kind terms like ‘pencil’. Figures to be discussed include Frege, Russell, Kripke, Donnellan, Searle, Evans, Putnam, Burge, Grice, Kaplan, Martí, Neale, Bach, Reimer.
 
Methodology. Our discussion of definite descriptions will raise a lively issue of general significance for the philosophy of language: How should settle whether a linguistic phenomenon is to be handled “semantically” or “pragmatically”?
 
This is not an introduction to the philosophy of language. Anyone wishing to take it who has not already taken a course in the philosophy of language should consult with me before enrolling.
 
Requirements
(i) A brief weekly email raising questions about, making criticisms of, or developing points concerning, matters discussed in the class and reading for that week. 50% of grade.
(ii) A class presentation based on a draft for a paper (topic chosen in consultation with me). The draft to be submitted before Tuesday of the week of presentation. 20% of grade.
(iii) A 2,500 word paper probably arising from the draft in (ii). 30% of grade.
 
READINGS
Devitt, M., and K. Sterelny. 1999. Language and Reality. 2nd. edn. MIT.  0-631-19689-7.
Martinich, A. P., ed. The Philosophy of Language (Oxford)
Ostertag, G. ed. 1998. Definite Descriptions: A Reader (MIT). 0-262-65049-5.
Reimer, M. and A. Bezuidenhout, eds. 2004. Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford. 0-19-927052-X
Hawthorne, J., and David Manley. 2012. The Reference Book. Oxford. 978-0-19-969367-2
Bianchi, A. ed. 2015. In On Reference. Oxford: Oxford. 978–0–19–871408–8
Haukioja, ed. 2015. Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language, Bloomsbury. 978-1-4725-7073-4
King, J. 2001. Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account. MIT. 0-262-11263-9

This course will satisfy Distribution Group A.

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Phil 76000
Zen
Prof. Priest

4 credits
Wednesday 9:30-11:30
Room TBA 


The two and a half thousand years of Buddhist philosophy, with its many different schools, is a rich tradition in all areas of philosophy. Zen (禪, Chin: Chan) is a particularly intriguing form of Buddhism, combining, as it does, a claim that the ultimate nature of reality cannot be characterised or explained by conceptual thinking, together with sophisticated discussions in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind, about this.  In this course we will examine Zen philosophy.  Zen cannot be understood without understanding the traditions of Buddhism and Daoism on which it draws.  The first half of the course will look at these. This will involve looking at, amongst other things, parts of the Mūlamadhymakakārikā, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, and the Zhuangzi. In the second part of the course, we will turn to the writings of Zen philosophers themselves, including those of Huineng, Linji (Rinzai), and Dōgen. Background reading:

Hershock, P. (2019), ‘Chan Buddhism’, in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/buddhism-chan/.

Nagatomo, S. (2019), ‘Japanese Zen Buddhist Philosophy’, in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/japanese-zen/.


This course will satisfy either Distribution Group A or Group D.

This course will satisfy the program meta-requirement.


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Phil 80200
PhD Proseminar
Profs. Khalidi and Vasiliou

4 credits
Wednesday 11:45-1:45
Room TBA 


The Proseminar is restricted to and required for students entering the PhD program.

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Phil 80300 
MA Proseminar
Prof. Gilmore
4 credits
Wednesday 11:45-1:45
Room TBA 


The Proseminar is restricted to and required for students entering the MA program. The primary goal is to help students develop skills in seminar discussion, presentation, and graduate-level philosophy research and writing. The course will cover a wide range of areas so as to give students a global (well, mostly Anglo-American) perspective on philosophy before they begin to specialize as their studies develop. Thus, unlike in other seminars, the emphasis will be, not on building up expertise in one area, but on honing philosophical skills that can be applied more generally.  The class will be collaborative, more like a lab than an instructor-led seminar, and all students will be responsible for actively contributing to class discussion.   
A final dimension of the course is that we will devote considerable attention to the basic mechanics of doing scholarly work in philosophy.  Thus, we will discuss such nuts-and-bolts issues as: what makes a good writing sample for PhD and other sorts of academic applications; publishing in academic journals and giving conference presentations; the relations between graduate program rankings, areas of specialization, and placement in jobs and postdocs; research and writing methods (including, e.g., use of citation software); and so on.

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Phil 80000
Topics in Modal Logic
Profs. Kripke and Weiss

4 credits
Wednesday 2:00-4:00
Room TBA 

Saul Kripke’s important work on modal logic, begun while still in high school, helped usher in a new “semantic” epoch for the field and made facility with modal logic indispensable to many philosophers, computer scientists, and others as well. Some sense of the richness and variety of contemporary modal logic is captured in a forthcoming festschrift, Saul Kripke on Modal Logic (Springer, Yale Weiss and Romina Padró, editors), which features contributions by many of the field’s leading figures. Following the format of the two previous seminars, this seminar will principally be structured around guest lectures on topics in modal logic—both philosophical and technical—by contributors to this volume. The final exact schedule is TBA.

Students taking the seminar for credit will be expected to attend regularly and either submit a term paper on some topic in modal logic or take an exam. Familiarity with elementary propositional and first-order classical logic will be assumed; some previous exposure to modal logic would be beneficial but is not required. Supplementary classes reserved for registered students may be scheduled to cover the essentials of basic modal logic.

Note: this class will commence meeting on Wednesday, September, 22nd.


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Phil 77800 
Aesthetics and Nature
Prof. Shapshay

4 credits
Thursday 11:45-1:45
Room TBA 


“Aesthetics and Nature” takes up two main clusters of questions: First, what constitutes appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature? Is it importantly different from appropriate art appreciation?  Second, to what extent are aesthetic values important for environmentalism? That is, are aesthetic values too weak, too ‘scenery-obsessed,’ too elitist, or generally, too anthropocentric to outweigh human-welfare based reasons to exploit nature as a resource? Given the alarming effects and acceleration of anthropogenic climate change, these guiding questions feel especially urgent today.
 
To investigate these questions, we’ll start with some historical treatments of the three main aesthetic categories to emerge in 18th c. European aesthetics (predominantly but not exclusively with respect to nature): Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757), Immanuel Kant’s The Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790), and Uvedale Price’s “Essay on the Picturesque as Compared with the Sublime and Beautiful” (1794). Then we’ll consider the increasing turn toward aesthetics as philosophy of art in the 19th c. (due in large part to Hegel), before turning to the (re)birth of environmental aesthetics around the social movements of the 1970s up to the present.

Contemporary readings will be grouped thematically and will include:

  • Allen Carlson. 2009. Nature and Landscape: An Introduction to Environmental Aesthetics Columbia University Press.
  • Noël Carroll, 1993. “On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History” in Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell eds. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Cambridge UP, 244-266.
  • William Cronon, 1995. “The Trouble with Wilderness” in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 69-90.
  • Yuriko Saito, 1998. “Appreciating Nature on Its Own Terms” Environmental Ethics 20: 135-149.
  • Andrew Brennan, 1984. “The Moral Standing of Natural Objects.” Environmental Ethics 6: 35–56.
  • Janna Thompson, 1995. “Aesthetics and the Value of Nature.” Environmental Ethics 17: 291–305.
  • Holmes Rolston, III. 2002. “From Beauty to Duty: Aesthetics of Nature and Environmental Ethics.” In Environment and the Arts: Perspective on Environmental Aesthetics, edited by Arnold Berleant, 127–141. Aldershot: Ashgate.
  • Elliott Sober. 1986. “Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism.” In The Preservation of Species, edited by Bryan G. Norton, 173–194. Princeton University Press.
  • Robert D. Bullard. 1994. "Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities." In Reflecting on Nature: Readings in Environmental Philosophy, edited by Lori Gruen and Dale Jamieson, 132–141. Oxford University Press.
  • Ned Hettinger, 2005. “Allen Carlson’s Environmental Aesthetics and the Protection of the Environment.” Environmental Ethics 27: 57–76.
    • ———. 2008. “Objectivity in Environmental Aesthetics and Environmental Protection.” In Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty, edited by Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott, 413–437. Columbia University Press.
  • Glenn Parsons, 2018. “Nature Aesthetics and the Respect Argument” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism special issue “The Good, the Beautiful, the Green” eds. Sandra Shapshay & Levi Tenen.
  • Robert Stecker. 2012. “Epistemic Norms, Moral Norms, and Nature Appreciation.” Environmental Ethics 34: 247–264.
  • Nick Zangwill. 2000. “In Defence of Moderate Aesthetic Formalism.” Philosophical Quarterly 50: 476–493.
  • Jennifer Welchman. 2018 “Aesthetics of Nature, Constitutive Goods, and Environmental Conservation” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism special issue “The Good, the Beautiful, the Green” eds. Sandra Shapshay & Levi Tenen.
  • Sandra Shapshay. 2013. “Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the Neglect of the Sublime” British Journal of Aesthetics.
  • Katie McShane. 2018. “The Role of Awe in Environmental Ethics” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism special issue “The Good, the Beautiful, the Green” eds. Sandra Shapshay & Levi Tenen.

This course will satisfy Distribution Group C.

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Phil 77200
Law and Language
Prof. Neale

4 credits
Thursday 2:00-4:00
Room TBA 

 

This seminar will address problems at the intersection of philosophy and legal theory that have distinctive linguistic and epistemological components. The problems in question arise in connection with the following:

The nature of law and its linguistic promulgation 
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press
The language of civil disobedience
The interpretation of legal texts
Intentions and evidence for intentions
Ambiguity, vagueness and underspecification
Varieties of textualism

No detailed knowledge of legal theory, linguistics or the philosophy of language will be assumed.

This course will satisfy Distribution Group A.


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Phil 77900 / MPH-0007
Social Justice in Public Health and Medicine
Prof. Rhodes
4 credits
Thursday 4:00-6:30 (Sept. 8 - Dec. 2)
Room TBA 

 

Justice is a major concern in theoretical ethics and political philosophy and a huge literature is devoted to trying to explain what justice is and what it entails. This course will examine a broad spectrum of issues in medicine, medical research, and public health that involve questions about justice. In light of these critical examples, we will review central philosophical views on justice and explore their implications for policies during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Throughout the seminar we shall be engaged in two activities: (1) identifying issues of justice in clinical practice and public health, and (2) developing an understanding of how theories of justice apply to different populations and in different public health and medical contexts. By going from practice to theory and from theory back again to practice, we will advance understanding of the theoretical literature as well as the requirements of justice in public health, medicine, and our society.

The course will begin with an examination of resource allocations in public health and medicine that raise questions about justice. It will move on to examine contemporary theoretical work by authors who focus on justice in medicine (e.g., Norman Daniels and Paul Menzel). As the seminar progresses, we will develop an understanding of how U.S. mechanisms for health care delivery have come about and examine how medical resources are distributed elsewhere. We will critically consider the special needs of social groups (e.g., the poor, children, women, the elderly, African-Americans, prisoners), dilemmas that arise (e.g., policies during the COVID19 pandemic, treatment of premature and compromised neonates), and ways in which resource allocations do and do not express justice.

By the end of this course participants should be able to:

  • Explain different concepts of justice.
  • Explain how justice is a relevant consideration in the allocation of different medical resources.
  • Evaluate ways in which medical and public health resources are allocated and provide arguments for distributing them one way rather than another.
  • Justify decisions about the distribution of medical and public health resources in terms of reasons that other reasonable people should accept.
  • Apply concepts of justice to circumstances in which a limited supply of medical and public health resources are allocated.

Readings:

  • Rosamond Rhodes, Margaret P. Battin & Anita Silvers, editors, 2012, Medicine and Social Justice: Essays on the Distribution of Health Care, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press.

* Additional papers from the current literature will be posted on the course website.

* Topics will be introduced with PowerPoint presentations posted on the course website.


This course will satisfy Distribution Group C.


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